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THE GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AND 
EVERYDAY EPISTEMOLOGY
CLAIRE DONOVAN
Research on the governance of publicly funded research does not recognize that
social science and ‘science’ are distinct activities. Neither does it recognize that regu-
lating research policy in purely science and technology terms has undesirable conse-
quences for the social sciences – intended or otherwise. This paper seeks to correct
these omissions and considers the governance of social science through the example
of regulating ‘everyday epistemology’ at the science policy level. The British research
council system is used in order to demonstrate how social science has been polit-
ically constructed as a legitimate enterprise for public funding. We find that social
science is in fact regulated by non-social scientists. The result is that social science,
seen as a square peg, is forced into the round hole of natural scientific thinking.
When this policy is translated into governance structures it creates a ‘slave social
science’ and subverts the role of social science as social science.
INTRODUCTION
Historically, the governance of science includes the governance of social
science. The purpose of this paper is to ask at what cost to the future of
social science? As this paper will outline, the price is nothing less than creat-
ing a ‘slave social science’ and undermining the role of social science as
social science.
The aim of this paper is to make the case that while there is research into
the governance of science, there is a need for separate research into the gov-
ernance of social science. The literature on the governance of science does
not recognize that science and social science are distinct activities; nor does
it consider that regulating social science as if it were ‘positivistic’ science
produces undesirable consequences.
This paper addresses the governance of social science using the example
of regulating ‘everyday epistemology’ at the science policy level. The term
‘everyday epistemology’ is used to signify that theories of knowledge are
not confined to a transcendental philosophical realm, but are grounded in
routine scientific and social scientific practice. Epistemology is also ‘everyday’
in a political sense since it can be used rhetorically to compare or differenti-
ate scientific and social scientific spheres. British science policy documents
allow us to trace how, in the second half of the twentieth century, the role of
social science has been politically constructed as a legitimate enterprise for
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public funding. We find that the ‘everyday epistemology’ of social science is 
regulated by non-social scientists and this square peg is thus squeezed to fit 
the round hole of natural scientific thinking. This produces a social science 
that makes sense to natural scientists.
Remaining with the case of the British research council system, and draw-
ing upon previous empirical research (Donovan 2002, 2003), we find that 
when this regulation of everyday epistemology is translated into govern-
ance structures it creates a ‘slave social science’ and also denies the role of 
social science as social science by perpetuating what has been called the 
‘science wars’. First, social science is epistemologically ‘enslaved’ by a 
science and technology policy that defines social science’s purpose as 
belonging to and working for science. Institutional arrangements then 
follow that restrict social science’s freedom, making it ‘slavish’ within a 
research council policy network where financial incentives steer the ESRC 
towards offering complete obedience to an overarching science and techno-
logy orientation. It also means accepting a subordinate function in formulat-
ing research directions when, for example, we find that national thematic 
priorities are created by a research council policy network where social 
science lies at the margins. The contribution of social science, then, is not 
predicated on its own terms. Regulating social science as science also perpetu-
ates the ‘science wars’ by privileging ‘positivist’ social science and thereby 
overlooking the potential utility of interpretative and reflexive social science 
and their associated anthropological methods. In both instances we find that 
what is considered to be legitimate social science is being regulated through 
the policy network by non-social scientists. These examples are practical 
manifestations of the institutional governance of social science and demon-
strate that regulating social science as science does not work.
To successfully regulate social science as social science the mode of gov-
ernance needs to change. As this paper makes clear, science and technology 
policy can redefine social science as empirical social science plus ‘added 
interpretative value’, and thus fully utilize its full spectrum of approaches 
and methods, and thus allow social science to contribute to the research 
council policy network on its own terms. The paper concludes by outlining 
future research directions, including reflexively applying the notion of regu-
lating everyday epistemology back to science and technology themselves, 
asking if they too may be similarly in thrall.
THE GOVERNANCE OF SCIENCE
There are two main sources of literature which deal with the governance of 
science. Somewhat surprisingly, work that explicitly addresses the govern-
ance of science has the least to say about the governance of science – at least 
in the sense that this kind of governance is generally understood within the 
political science literature. For example, in The Governance of Science (2000), 
Fuller does not categorically set down what he means by the term ‘govern-
ance’, although his position is enigmatically summarized by his epithet:
‘That science both governs and is governed without being formally considered 
as a government’ (2000, p. 8). On the one hand he details the Leviathan-like 
qualities of science as an institution: ‘Science is a vehicle of global govern-
ance’, and ‘the mystery surrounding science as a political concept lies less in 
its day-to-day business (i.e. “research”) than its capacity to speak on behalf 
of the whole of humanity in a way that transcends national differences as 
well as other cultural and economic barriers’. On the other hand, Fuller is 
interested in the internal politics of science, which is generally perceived to 
be a democratic institution although it is governed by a self-selected scien-
tific elite. Fuller is ultimately preoccupied with the dual interests of demo-
cratizing science as a powerful unelected institution that governs, and 
democratizing science in terms of who can participate in it and how. He is 
not concerned with how scientific research is regulated or shaped by 
government policy.
The second, and most fruitful, source of literature on the governance of 
science, deals with the governance of national research policies. This impli-
citly addresses the governance of science because the policies studied are 
without exception premised upon the government or governance of science 
and technology research. It is this literature which is reviewed below, and in 
this context ‘research policy’ is taken to be the equivalent of ‘science and 
technology policy’.
However, nowhere does the ‘governance of science’ or ‘governance of 
research policy’ literature consider the peculiar place of social science (or 
indeed the arts or humanities) within science governance. The most striking 
example of this is an in-depth OECD report on UK research governance 
(2003b), which specifically studies the research councils, and only mentions 
the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) in a list of research coun-
cil names – all examples and illustrations in the report are purely science 
and technology based. Even where science is defined as Wissenschaft, to 
include all academic disciplines (Fuller 2000, pp. 7–8; MUSCIPOLI (Manag-
ing with Uncertainty in Science Policy) 2003, para 1.5), social science is not 
separately analysed, and the effects of focusing on the governance of science 
in terms of the experimental science paradigm alone are neither recognized 
nor considered.
Why science governance?
Why do nations have a science research policy? And why is it important to 
think about this in governance terms? The collective narrative resonates 
with the terms ‘utility’, ‘commercialization’ and ‘wealth creation’. Govern-
ments believe that scientific discovery creates social and economic progress, 
and so they desire to harness scientific research towards the twin causes of 
national technological advance and enhanced international competitiveness. 
In the pursuit of these goals, governments wish to derive maximum utility 
out of finite public funds while directing the research effort as efficiently as 
possible. This is the genesis of science governance.
Féron and Crowley (2003, p. 381) point to a growing ‘consciousness’ 
among European policy-makers that ‘policy levers’ or incentives are the 
means to achieving the ends of research quality and economic competitive-
ness. This entails the introduction of competitive research funding or regu-
lar evaluation procedures, which follow the mantra that only ‘useful’ 
research deserves funding. The same trend is recognized in the wider inter-
national context of OECD countries: that there are growing government 
demands for science systems to change in order to compete, and a catalyst 
for this is recognized in the governance of public research funding, decision 
making and priority setting, as well as the assessment of institutions in rela-
tion to their contribution to knowledge creation, economic growth and 
social needs (OECD 2003a). We are witnessing an internationalization of 
science policy in its rhetoric and in its increasingly uniform national mani-
festations. This hails the idea of cross-national competitiveness leading to a 
homogenized research orientation – a global governance premised upon the 
progressive promise of science and technology research. But what does this 
utopian (or dystopian) technocratic vision entail for the future of social 
scientific research thus conceived?
It is politically interesting to note that the largely eurocentric focus of the 
governance of research policy literature is directly linked to European 
Union funding (Caswill 2001, 2004; Hackmann 2001; Féron and Crowley 
2003; Guena et al. 2003; MUSCIPOLI 2003). This is reflexive in two respects:
(1) that this research on research governance is itself the product of research 
governance in the form of EU research initiatives; and that (2) some of this 
‘useful’ research is being utilized by science research funders to greater 
understand and hence attempt to control research governance processes 
(MUSCIPOLI 2003, n.d.). This is part of a trend that was recognized as early 
as 2000 when Funtowicz et al. (2000) observed increasing attention at the 
European level to scientific aspects of research policy and administrative 
decisions, and noted that the European Commission was adopting guide-
lines in areas such as the management of knowledge. A high profile example 
of EU-funded research on research governance is the Managing with Uncer-
tainty in Science Policy (MUSCIPOLI) Project, financed by the European 
Fifth Framework Programme. This project is largely comprised of research 
administrators, and seeks to identify important trends in the governance of 
science. It asks: ‘in terms of achieving science policy goals and/or 
priorities…how does the mode of governance affect the governability of science 
in various national and/or international settings?’ (MUSCIPOLI n.d., p. 2). 
The project also provides guidelines for research funding organizations, for 
example, ‘managing policy (including directive and responsive research), 
managing relationships (including budget ministries, academics), getting 
the science right, and managing research outputs and outcomes (including 
evaluation)’. We may question whether this research is seeking merely to 
better understand the processes of science governance, or if it is an attempt 
to utilize this knowledge with the aim of increasing science government.
What is science governance?
To understand what science governance is and how it operates, it is neces-
sary to distinguish between the government and governance of research 
policy. Research government is recognized as the implementation of 
research priorities by a research policy elite in a top-down, codified manner 
which does not embrace ideas coming upwards from the academic constitu-
ency. Research government denotes: ‘conventional policy concern with the 
production and formulation of rules forbidding or compelling actions or 
classes of actions; the monitoring of compliance; and the implementation of 
sanctions’ (Féron and Crowley 2003, p. 373).
However, the general consensus in the literature is that attempts to 
govern research have been abandoned since: ‘It is not possible to “order” 
research’ (ibid. 2003, p. 385). One reason for this is that research policy-
making is ‘information-deficient’ – only those who can do the research have 
the knowledge of what can be done. In this light only general goals and 
means can be planned for since researchers cannot produce results in 
advance. It follows that: ‘Active compliance cannot be mandated’ by 
research policy, and that there should be cooperation between policy-
makers and researchers rather than ‘simply passive compliance’ (ibid. 2003,
p. 385).
For example, in their Europe-wide study, Féron and Crowley provide an
overview of policy initiatives between 1987 and 2000 that points to a com-
mon trajectory of change from research government to research governance:
‘in the direction of “steering” policies using negotiation and, above all,
incentive structures, rather than major institutional transformation, aggre-
gate planning, top-down priority setting [and] strategic resource allocation’
(ibid. 2003, p. 381). The general picture is that governments are perceived to
realize that research cannot be managed hierarchically, believing that gov-
ernment of research ‘is neither possible nor desirable’ (ibid. 2003, p. 385),
and they either drift towards or actively embrace policies that favour
research governance, realizing that while research cannot be directed it can
be steered if consensus is gained. Indeed, the governance of science and
technology research is taken as ‘the paradigm case’ for applying governance
theories to policy: ‘Here, policy, it seems, can do little more than define very
general objectives and provide a framework for research activity’ (ibid. 2003,
p. 373).
It may, however, be naïve to believe that research government has simply 
melted away to be replaced by research governance. For example, an inter-
esting question to consider is whether national thematic priorities and fore-
sight exercises are best understood in the context of research government or 
research governance. For Van der Meulen (1998), an erosion of state trust in 
the self-organizing processes of science and an increase in evaluations, 
national research initiatives and foresight exercises, points to research 
government. Hackmann finds mixed modes of governance in operation 
when, for example, she views UK Foresight exercises as network-based
(governance) and the accompanying centralized research priorities as hier-
archical (government) (Hackmann 2001, pp. 26–7). In contrast, Féron and 
Crowley (2003, p. 386) find that while the idea of large research initiatives 
seems to imply a model of government: ‘It is only a superficial paradox that 
their changes correlate with a move away from a planning or command 
approach to policy’. In other words, while research initiatives may seem to 
be directive, they in fact accommodate more governance and less govern-
ment. However, they also take the view that while research governance may 
in theory appear to be less interventionist than research government, it may 
at times be more ‘hands on’ than government (ibid. 2003, p. 373).
Despite such conflicting examples, little doubt is expressed within the 
literature that governance rather than government is the dominant mode by 
which science and technology policies are implemented. But how does gov-
ernance operate? The answer is through ‘steering’ – that is, indirect govern-
ment influence. In other words, decentralized steering is a form of scientific 
self-regulation, although the government still decides the policy (Hackmann 
2001, p. 21). ‘Steering’ is an ambiguous term, and a popular explanatory 
account of this within the science governance literature is borrowed from 
new public management discourse, applying the principal-agent model to 
the policy sciences in order to picture how policy is translated from the gov-
ernment to dedicated agencies. In a nutshell, principal-agent analysis states 
that a principal (government) transfers resources to an agent (a scientist) to 
realize objectives which the principal cannot achieve (to conduct scientific 
research). In addition, the transfer of resources gives the principal the right 
to monitor the agent (Van der Meulen 1998, pp. 399–400). Principal-agent 
studies focus on what incentive structures would attract agents (scientists) 
to the interests and objectives of the principal, and what strategies agents 
adopt to make their own objectives dominant. Braun (1993) notes that an 
agent can also be a research agency, so scientists can become a third party in 
this relationship.
The key, then, to understanding how governance structures operate is the 
use of incentives (also referred to as ‘levers’), which are the ‘resources avail-
able at the level of the state that can be mobilized in the pursuit of specified 
objectives with at least partially predictable outcomes’ (Féron and Crowley 
2003, p. 379). In this manner the autonomy of the research sector can be 
utilized by the state as a policy resource to steer scientists towards planned 
policy objectives. Major levers include funding and career patterns. Funding 
is an important lever simply because research often depends upon the funds 
made available by the state, and effective governance can exploit this by 
ensuring that basic funding is available at lower levels than initiatives, steer-
ing researchers towards pursuing research in pre-defined national priority 
areas. Employment policies can make career patterns become levers  in  
systems where, for example, fixed-term contracts are favoured over tenure 
and their renewal is part of a competitive process, steering researchers to 
apply for public funding (ibid. 2003, p. 383).
We have seen that research funding has become more governance-driven 
in recent years, and this has wide-reaching implications for social science 
research that is set within a ‘one size fits all’ science and technology policy. 
We shall see that regulating social science under these auspices produces 
undesirable outcomes that backfire against policy intentions – for example, 
the distinctive features of social science are unaccounted for, undermining 
its potential ‘utility’. In this respect, what is fast becoming the global mode 
of science governance is inadequate and needs to change.
THE GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
In contrast to the governance of science,  there have to date been very few  
attempts to apply governance theories directly to the social sciences. The 
small amount of research that exists has a largely Canadian and British 
orientation, and is confined to the study of the regulatory powers of research 
ethics committees. While it has limited general application, this work relates 
to several themes drawn out in this paper, such as: (1) the external desire to 
regulate social scientific activities; (2) the bureaucratization of social science 
research; (3) imposing inappropriate scientific models upon the social 
sciences; and (4) the democratization of research.
This interest in governance was originally prompted by medical research-
ers becoming aware that psychologists and sociologists engaged in 
similar activities to their own were often exempt from submitting research 
proposals to ethics committees (for example, British social scientists 
conducting medical research funded outside the National Health Service). 
Claiming concern primarily for the protection of research subjects, Williamson 
et al. (2002) expressed the worry that social science research slips through the 
ethical review net. While self-regulation exists in various forms (profes-
sional guidelines, peer review, funding application procedures, and steering 
and advisory groups), this is viewed as inadequate since it does not meet the 
increasing demands ‘in the current political and economic climate’ for 
accountability and democratic science (ibid. 2002, para 6.2). Regulation of 
social science research is called for in the form of ethics review committees 
modelled upon existing scientific practice. ‘Whilst “academic freedom” and 
fears of censorship are important these concerns relate, [sic] to the wider 
debate about whose interests do social researchers serve and what is the role 
of government (trans-national) regulatory bodies in ensuring that standards 
of ethical practice and good quality science are maintained?’
Ethical review of social science is not necessarily limited to medical 
research and is commonplace in, for example, Australia and the USA. Some 
critics of review committees fear an incipient policing of social science 
research by ‘bureaucratic gatekeepers who use ethics as managerial ideol-
ogy’ (Furedi 2002, p. 20). This regulation is seen to be driven by applying a 
model of risks and benefits to research subjects that is based on biomedical 
ethical principles that are inappropriate for general social science. There is 
also concern about a lack of transparency or the ‘research ethical review
black box’ since ethics committee proceedings are conducted in secret 
(Fitzgerald and Yule 2003), and this in fact makes for undemocratic science.
This cluster of research on the governance of social science remains an isol-
ated phenomenon. We have seen that the governance of social science has 
not been addressed by the literature on the governance of science. Here 
social science is either treated as part of a homogenized, technocratic science 
(OECD 2003a) or is recognized in the sense of being part of Wissenschaft 
(MUSCIPOLI 2003, para 1.5) but not analysed differently. Nowhere has it 
been considered that social science and science are different enterprises, or 
that science governance has undesirable consequences for the social 
sciences, intended or otherwise.
Such an omission is a curious one. It is not entirely surprising that the 
distinctive features of social science are overlooked by policy-makers or 
scientists, but it is quite remarkable that social scientists engaged in 
researching science governance do not recognize this. While reflexivity is 
discussed (see, for example, Féron and Crowley 2003, p. 372), no social 
scientist has thought to apply this notion to their own endeavours and ask 
how the governance of science impacts upon their own research activities or 
how it affects social science generally. And nowhere does the governance of 
science literature discuss everyday epistemology, or what is considered 
legitimate social science research, or what an unfettered publicly funded 
social science would be like in its approach and its contribution to national 
research directions.
The governance of social science and everyday epistemology
That there is undoubtedly a strong case for studying the governance of 
social science is clearly illustrated using the idea of regulating everyday 
epistemology at the science policy level. While this may seem to be a rather 
abstract example of the governance of social science, everyday epistemology 
in fact is an ideal starting point since it cuts straight to the heart of the funda-
mental differences between science and social science; it also helps reveal 
the various undesirable outcomes of regulating social science as science.
As has been said, the term ‘everyday epistemology’ is used to signify that 
theories of knowledge are not confined to some transcendental philosoph-
ical realm, but underpin routine scientific and social scientific practice. 
Epistemology is also ‘everyday’ in a political sense, and can be used rhetor-
ically to compare or differentiate scientific and social scientific spheres. But 
what has this to do with governance? Are we to believe that policy-makers 
take the time to philosophize about the scientific status of social science?
Taking the British case as an example, this is precisely what has happened 
on several occasions, and policy documents (Clapham 1946; Heyworth 1965; 
Rothschild 1982; Office of Science and Technology 1993) allow us to trace 
how the role of social science research has been politically constructed as a 
legitimate enterprise for public funding. King (1998) does not mention 
governance, but studies the Clapham and Heyworth reports to relate how
consensus politics in Britain created the political need to stress the neutrality
of publicly funded social science research and consequently produced a bias
towards ‘positivistic’ scientific methodologies which were seen as untainted
by ideology. Donovan (2003, p. 3) maintains that these government docu-
ments ‘provide an insight into policymakers’ changing attitudes towards the
scientific status of social science during the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury and illustrate the various rhetorical manoeuvres employed in order to
squeeze this square peg into the round hole of natural scientific thinking’.
The 1946 Clapham Report considered whether there should be a research
council for the social sciences, and decided against this. The report was pro-
duced at a time of academic and establishment hostility towards the social
sciences, which were thought to lack the strict methodological rigour of the
natural sciences while not possessing the intellectual respectability of the
humanities (which did not dare to harbour scientific pretensions) (King
1997). Yet this early policy document reveals a sophisticated understanding
of social science’s interpretative and reflexive credentials that is rarely
observed in later years. For example, the natural and social sciences are
compared and found to diverge in their remit, methods and relationship to
their subject matter.
There are profound differences between the natural and the social
sciences, depending partly upon the nature of the subject matter, partly
upon the technical methods which are apparent in each sphere. The lead-
ing method of many of the natural sciences is controlled experiment; in
the nature of things, the social sciences present much less scope for this
method. The subject matter of the natural sciences is independent of the
results of research; research in the social sciences may itself change the
subject matter it has to deal with. (Clapham 1946, p. 5)
However, the report recommendations came out against forming a research 
council for social science on very different epistemological grounds, brush-
ing aside any notion of fundamental difference by arguing that social 
science research did not yet warrant public funding and needed time to 
mature until it could replicate the methods of natural science, match its 
achievements and thereby similarly contribute to national wealth creation. 
A glimpse of the imagined future utility of social science is offered using the 
example of economics, which is taken to exemplify the empirical refinement 
and policy application to which social science may aspire. Sociology, on the 
other hand, is seen to represent all that is lacking in the current state of the 
social sciences: interpretativism is viewed as a weakness, and there is genu-
ine concern that sociology’s left-leaning orientation would mean that the 
premature public funding of the social sciences could foster ‘a crystallisation 
of spurious orthodoxies’ (Clapham 1946, p. 29).
Two decades later, the Heyworth Report recommended the creation of the 
Social Science Research Council (SSRC) (Heyworth 1965). The report does 
not discuss the epistemological status of social science, although implicit
assumptions are apparent. For example, Heyworth offers a technocratic 
model of a fact-finding, multidisciplinary social science bound to ‘user’ 
requirements (ibid. 1965, p. 17). Social science is firmly recast in an idealized 
natural scientific mould, as a problem-solving activity that can ‘fix’ things or 
offer permanent solutions. But this technological conception of social 
science did not convince all of its critics, and while its interpretative and 
ideological aspects were glossed over at the science policy level they none-
theless remained – and were clearly at odds with a positivistic ideal of 
science. This inherent epistemological disjunction almost proved disastrous 
for the social sciences in Britain. A further two decades later, tackling these 
perceived weaknesses became a personal crusade for Keith Joseph, the 
Conservative Secretary of State for Education and Science, a self-proclaimed 
disciple of the Popperian model of science who opposed the very idea of a 
social science. For example, I have elsewhere related how, in government 
documents and personal communications, Joseph could not bring himself to 
use the term social ‘science’, preferring social ‘studies’ (see Donovan 2002,
p. 231).
Joseph waged war against the SSRC and, backed by senior Cabinet col-
leagues, launched a government enquiry intended to liquidate or dismem-
ber this public body. It was everyday epistemology that motivated Joseph’s 
antagonism, and this is directly addressed in the 1982 Rothschild Report 
into the SSRC (Rothschild 1982). Rothschild eloquently elaborates upon the 
foundations of the social sciences in the work of Condorcet, Mill and  
Durkheim, and states that while ‘the true lack of analogy between the physical 
and social sciences was only slowly recognised’ (ibid. 1982, para 4.1), social 
science is intrinsically valuable (ibid.1982, para 4.2). Rothschild crushingly 
describes a Popperian view of science as entirely inapplicable to under-
standing social science (ibid. 1982, paras 4.4–4.12) although he concedes that 
the ‘excessive claims of sociology’ (under fire here again) had caused an 
understandable backlash against the social sciences. While this report 
acknowledges fundamental differences between the social and physical 
sciences, the preference for a science-driven mode of social scientific enquiry 
remains. While the SSRC survived this onslaught, the cost included an 
epistemological victory for Joseph who forced the Council to change its 
name. On the suitably Orwellian date of 1 January 1984, the Social Science 
Research Council was renamed the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC). While the word ‘Science’ may have disappeared from the ESRC’s 
title, it continued to define, from without and within, the ESRC’s terms of 
engagement as part of the science research funding system.
The Clapham and Heyworth Reports are examples of government 
attempts to regulate the everyday epistemology of social science; the 
Rothschild Report was commissioned as part of the desire to directly govern the 
political orientation and scientific status of social science research. We have 
previously noted the view that efforts to govern science research in a top-
down manner have been unfruitful (Féron and Crowley 2003, p. 385). In this
respect, the 1993 White Paper Realising Our Potential (Office of Science and 
Technology 1993) is progressive in that it directly embraces a model of 
science governance. This legislation transferred the research council system 
from the Education Department to the newly created Office of Science and 
Technology, and the research councils were restructured into what we 
would recognize as a policy network designed to produce a nationally 
coordinated science and technology research effort, dependent upon close 
inter-council cooperation and steered towards the express utilitarian goal of 
national wealth creation. This policy document does not venture into the 
realms of epistemology, nor does it refer directly to social science or distin-
guish it from any other kind of scientific activity. Policy debates about the 
scientific status of social science had by this time become historical artefacts. 
The 1993 White Paper subsumed social science within a natural science 
model, taking epistemological equivalency for granted. We shall see below 
that while Realising Our Potential did not concern itself directly with every-
day epistemology, it has produced the most effective means for the govern-
ance of social science as science.
The cumulative effect of British science and technology policy upon 
regulating the everyday epistemology of social science has been to produce 
a variety of undesirable outcomes, intended or otherwise, because there is a 
mismatch between what social science is and how it has been politically 
defined (as regular science) by government actors who are non-social scien-
tists. We shall see below that the actual implementation of these policies has 
led to the creation of a subservient social science and has subverted the role 
of social science as social science.
Creating a ‘slave social science’
This paper uses insights gained from theories of governance to reinterpret 
previous empirical studies of research direction (Donovan 2002, 2003) and 
the examples that follow are derived from these sources. The notion of a 
‘slave social science’ evolved through studying the interactions involved in 
creating UK research council thematic priorities and observing how cross-
council negotiations act to marginalize the potential role of social science. 
Using data from elite interviews, policy documents and other official pub-
lications, this research found that ‘under the present UK national research 
strategy the place of social science is at its margins as an adjunct to the “real 
science”’ and ‘the public funding of social science research within a national 
science and technology framework creates “social science in the service of 
science and technology”’ (Donovan 2003, pp. 1–2). The paper expands upon 
this work to demonstrate how a ‘slave social science’ is ultimately the prod-
uct of regulating everyday epistemology. For example, we have seen that 
social science is epistemologically ‘enslaved’ by a science and technology 
policy that defines social science’s purpose as belonging to and working for 
science. We shall see that institutional arrangements follow which then 
restrict social science’s freedom, making it ‘slavish’ within a research council
policy network where the ESRC is steered by financial incentives to offer its 
obedience to the overarching science and technology orientation and to 
accept this subordinate function. We find that national thematic priorities 
are created by a research council policy network that a subaltern social 
science cannot contribute to on its own terms.
The push to create national thematic research priorities came from Realising 
Our Potential (Office of Science and Technology 1993). Pre-1975 there was no 
directed social science research, and then, in the cause of justifying public 
expenditure, the Advisory Board for the Research Councils (ABRC), which 
oversaw research council budgets, applied pressure on research councils to 
create research initiatives – at first in isolation and then in conjunction with 
each other. In this climate, the SSRC created a Research Initiatives Board as a 
visible mechanism for driving research towards applied and ‘relevant’ 
research initiatives. The intent was to appease the ABRC, but this move had 
far more substance than mere ‘impression management’ because, in science 
and technology policy terms, producing this kind of research was the 
SSRC’s raison d’être. However, this inevitably meant proving social science’s 
scientific credentials to non-social scientists in terms of subject matter and 
research methods, albeit through a combination of some window-dressing 
and some reality (Donovan 2002, pp. 111–50).
This arrangement became formalized post-1993 when the research council 
system was restructured to form what we would call a policy network. Fore-
sight exercises brought together various ‘stakeholders’ from government, 
science and industry to ‘shape research policy around one of the characteris-
tic projects of high modernity: maximising the competitive efficiency of the 
national economy’ (Moran 2003, p. 144). Foresight exercises guide cross-
council collaboration in generating suitable thematic priorities through a 
series of ongoing Spending Reviews, to be approved by the Director General 
of the Research Councils, the Minister concerned, and then the Treasury. We 
can identify the research councils as a policy network if we view the state as 
contracting out science research for the research councils to manage. This 
research council network is virtually autonomous of government, although 
steered by various ‘levers’ or financial incentives to conform to Foresight 
preferences to the satisfaction of the Director General and, ultimately, the 
Treasury.
In general governance theory, trust forms the ‘basis of network co-ordination’ 
and ‘shared values and norms are the glue which holds the complex set of 
relationships together’ (Rhodes 2003, p. 66). In turn, a successful Spending 
Review round depends upon close inter-council cooperation in producing 
coordinated collaborative science and technology projects, a relationship 
which has been cemented by forming the umbrella organization Research 
Councils UK (RCUK), an organization devoted almost exclusively to this 
task. It is only under these post-1993 arrangements that a highly harmon-
ized science and technology policy has been pursued, and we encounter 
research governance directed towards generally prescribed government
goals. This has fundamentally changed the role of social science in the 
research council system because the ESRC can only successfully participate 
in the policy network, and increase its resources, by mirroring the fixed aims 
of the overarching science and technology orientation – as witnessed by 
the accounts of various ESRC Chief Executives (see Donovan 2002, 2003, 
pp. 6–7). Social science can be said to be governed or ‘enslaved’, then, 
because the policy network is driven (at the Foresight and research council 
level) by non-social scientists who collectively fail to distinguish social 
science from general science. It is thus ‘slavish’, or coerced, because the process 
of cooperative governance entails that the ESRC has to share inappropriate 
values and norms which act against pursuing social science-led initiatives, 
and social science finds itself misplaced and lacking freedom or autonomy 
within the policy network. It is within this context that the ESRC began to 
produce its own internal thematic priorities to complement Foresight plan-
ning, driven by the desire to maximize ESRC funding, and the wish to trans-
form itself from a ‘buffer’ between social scientists and government to a 
research ‘broker’. At the same time the ESRC strategically adopted language 
games to fit the discourse of science policy, and within the policy network it 
continued to promote social science that matched the ‘positivist’ paradigm. 
Yet if we scratch the surface we find that these ESRC initiatives are deliber-
ately responsive, pointing to a potential rift between policy network 
interests and social science practice. However, the focus of this paper is on 
top-tier activities rather than the drivers and outcomes of internal ESRC 
policies and these are elaborated at length elsewhere (Donovan 2002, 
pp. 260–303).
Thus a ‘slave social science’ is born, and this is clearly illustrated by 
the thematic priorities that emerge from the policy network. For example, 
the 2004 RCUK thematic priorities were: e-Science, Basic Technology, 
Genomics, New and Emerging Science and Technology, Towards a Sustain-
able Energy Economy, a Long Term Technology Review, and Rural Econ-
omy and Land Use (Research Councils UK 2004). The latter has more 
obvious social science application and the ESRC took a leading role in 
designing this initiative, but in all other cases the place of social science at 
this policy level is limited to a tacked-on ‘the social consequences of…’ or 
‘social aspects of…’. The outcome of policy network deliberations is that 
‘governments support social science that makes sense to natural scientists’ 
which is ‘social science in the service of natural science and technology’ 
(Donovan 2002, p. 18). Epistemological parallelism has become firmly 
embedded in the policy network through using financial incentives to steer 
future research directions. Successful bids must conform to and thereby 
reinforce government policy expectations and assumptions.
The ‘slave social science’ thesis is particularly important when we con-
sider that 41 per cent of ESRC research funding in the financial year 2003–04 
was tied to research priorities, which were in turn tied to thematic priorities 
(Economic and Social Research Council 2004, p. 105). We have previously
noted here that across Europe science governance has been found to be on 
the increase and to be correlated with the pursuit of science and technology 
driven national research goals (Féron and Crowley 2003, p. 380), a pattern 
that is duplicated in wider OECD countries (OECD 2003a). While this inter-
national trend increases unchecked, social science as social science has a 
diminishing – if not disappearing – status at the national research policy 
formulation level.
‘Slave social science’ serves as a simple example of the pervasiveness of 
everyday epistemology when translated from policy documents to research 
governance structures. At the science policy level, what is considered to be 
legitimate social science is an externally imposed natural scientific concep-
tion of social science, an erroneous vision reinforced in the UK case by the  
research council policy network where social scientists will always form a  
minority and a small minority at that.
Perpetuating the ‘science wars’
The impact of regulating everyday epistemology at the policy level extends 
beyond dictating research directions. External (often combined with 
internal) constructions of the usefulness of ‘positivistic’ or empirical social 
science affect the perceived legitimacy of alternative social science 
approaches. This conception of social science acts to prolong the ‘science 
wars’ and overlooks the potential utility of interpretative social science and 
its associated methods.
The term ‘science wars’ is taken from Flyvbjerg (2001, pp. 1–3) and depicts 
the perennial battle over the foundations of social knowledge. Is social 
science a strictly scientific, objective fact-finding activity based upon empir-
ical investigation? Or are ‘facts’ merely constructions, and the best we can 
achieve is a subjective understanding of the meanings and interpretations of 
social actors garnered through using anthropological approaches? Put more 
crudely, is social science ‘positivist’ or interpretative? The governance of 
everyday epistemology privileges the former and disregards the latter.
It is proper to admit that underlying this paper is the assumption that 
there is a ‘natural’ form of social science that embraces pluralism, and 
assumes that quantification and interpretivism are not mutually incompatible. 
This paper demonstrates that this view is not accepted at the science policy 
level, and it is hotly contested between social scientists. Hermeneutic 
circularity suggests that proponents of these alternative visions of social 
science will remain divided, one side maintaining that interpretivism is 
deviant social science. However, the question this paper seeks to answer is 
not what social science is, but why a system of governance has come to 
favour particular approaches over others.
It is interesting to note that sociology is the social science discipline that 
has been singled out by policy documents for its lack of objectivity or defi-
ciencies of method. Indeed, it has become traditional sport for government 
reports to disparage sociology in some form while praising the discipline of
economics (Donovan 2003, p. 4). This situation has some roots in right-wing 
hostility towards sociologists, but beyond juxtaposing a rather naïve 
impression of sociology with an idealized picture of economics, this miscon-
struction is emblematic of the poles of the science wars and the perceived 
strengths and weaknesses of social science generally. Reflexivity, interpreta-
tivism and social theory stand in sharp relief to highly quantitative, applied 
‘positivistic’ research.
The ‘science wars’ rage within social science, recent British manifestations 
include symposia that address this issue – directly in sociology (Goldthorpe 
et al. 2004) and indirectly and, somewhat ironically in the context of this 
paper, in a political science discussion of what may be termed the social 
science of governance (Finlayson et al. 2004). These internecine spats are 
what help to define the boundaries of social science and its everyday epistem-
ology from the inside, and demonstrate that ‘positivist’ approaches are 
strongly supported from within and are not simply imposed from above.  
However, the point here is not what social scientists do or do not believe to 
be genuine social science, but the fact that at the policy level this decision 
has been taken out of their hands and is being externally regulated by non-
social scientists. The policy preference is to model social science upon 
idealized natural scientific practice, favouring user-oriented, fact-finding, 
‘positivistic’ approaches and their associated (and preferably quantitative) 
empirical methods. It follows that within the research council policy 
network there is no room for the ambiguity of interpretative social science 
(which is highly unlikely to be funded in Foresight terms). The ESRC stands 
to gain more trust, and secure greater resources, by promoting social science 
approaches that can be understood by the network, and have demonstrable 
relevance for achieving the network’s goals.
Regulating the everyday epistemology of social science as science perpetu-
ates the false dichotomy that is the ‘science wars’. ‘Useful’ social science 
becomes defined as ‘positivist’ social science, in contrast to the ‘fuzzy think-
ing’ of interpretative or reflexive social science and social theory. While the 
governance of everyday epistemology embraces a ‘positivist’ model of 
scientific practice, we must beware of confusing positivism with empiricism, 
since even highly quantitative empirical research is not necessarily prem-
ised upon the epistemological equivalency of the natural and social sciences. 
However, many social scientists will embrace the policy-makers’ vision 
because social science can be all the things required of it within the national 
science and technology framework. It can, however, also be more – hence 
the current controversies. Social science comes in more than one form – 
‘positivistic’ research is not the sum total of social science, and interpretative 
sociology and its associated anthropological methods can be both ‘useful’ 
and have ‘application’.
This can be demonstrated here in an interpretative manner. Following 
competing definitions of governance as ‘government without government’ 
and ‘government with more than government’ (Kjaer 2004, p. 28), it can be
similarly argued that the value of interpretative social science can be 
described both as: (1) social science without science; and (2) social science 
with more than science. In other words, in addition to, for example, applied 
quantitative social science, further explanation and understanding can be 
afforded by also using interpretative and reflexive approaches and methods 
that are not universally recognized as social ‘science’ but add more to our 
understanding of issues than quantitative social science in isolation. In this 
sense interpretative social science does have utility, something that could be 
understood in policy language as ‘added value’.
In governance terms, interpretative social science has become the social 
science that dare not speak its name. However, while the system of govern-
ance may favour certain ‘outputs’ it does not produce these alone: interpret-
ative social science, although not recognized at the policy level or promoted 
within the research council policy network, nevertheless exists. This disjunc-
tion between policy and practice is evidence that social science is being 
subject to inappropriate regulation. It would be simple to end the ‘science 
wars’, at the policy level at least – and to remove the contradiction between 
funding social science as science and actual social scientific practice – by 
embracing ‘useful’ (and hence legitimate) social science as empirical social 
science plus added interpretative value. So long as the governance of social 
science privileges ‘positivism’ and its associated methods, the terms of 
engagement of the ‘science wars’ will remain, and the distinctive features 
of social science will continue to be ignored.
CONCLUSION
The governance of science includes the governance of social science, and the 
aim of this paper has been to make the case that while there is research into 
the governance of science, there is a need for separate research into the gov-
ernance of social science. This paper has used the simple example of British 
government regulation of everyday epistemology to show that regulating 
social science as science produces undesirable consequences. The regulation 
of everyday epistemology occurs within government policy documents and 
is then transmitted to research governance structures. The examples of 
creating a ‘slave social science’ and perpetuating the ‘science wars’ are 
practical manifestations of the institutional governance of social science, and 
demonstrate that regulating social science as science does not work. This 
paper suggests that science and technology policy can redefine social 
science as empirical social science plus ‘added interpretative value’ and 
thereby emancipate social science as social science to realize its full utility 
within the national research effort.
There is undoubtedly a strong case for establishing the governance of 
social science as a field of study, and it can be extended to numerous areas. 
There is much scope for comparative research on the regulation of everyday 
epistemology and the various issues discussed here: the British case reveals 
apparent universal statements about the consequences of regulating social
science as science, and future research could test whether, for example, the 
slave social science thesis holds under comparative empirical analysis.
There is also wider potential for future research beyond the scope of this 
paper. There is a conflict between what social science is and how it has been 
politically defined; the effects of this mismatch could be studied through 
observing adverse displacement behaviours and adaptive strategies visible 
throughout the bureaucratic strata of publicly funded social science 
research. This holds from research council policy networks, to all levels of 
research council business (senior research management, Council, commit-
tees, the role of the research officer, research funding applications), to 
academic responses and actual research directions. It is also important to 
consider the relationship between research initiatives and responsive 
research, and whether responsive research is indirectly regulated or if 
research initiatives are responsive in nature. A further area of interest is the 
fact that an Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) entered the UK 
research council system in April 2005, prompting us to ask how it will adapt 
to being regulated as science, if this is indeed the way it is treated, and to 
note how the ESRC strategically positions itself in relation to it and if this is 
to the benefit or detriment of non-‘positivist’ approaches.
Perhaps the ultimate reflexivity of regulating everyday epistemology 
would be to adapt this approach to examine the place of non-social science 
disciplines within science governance – not only in the arts and humanities, 
but in the sciences also. This paper has assumed that social science is a 
special case. However, we can ask whether science governance fits with 
everyday scientific practice. Can medical research, for example, or even 
science and technology research, also be understood to be in the service of 
science and technology?
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